The Impact of the Spezzino judgment for third sector organisations by Pedro, Telles
 Cronfa -  Swansea University Open Access Repository
   
_____________________________________________________________
   
This is an author produced version of a paper published in :
European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Review
                                                                 
   





Telles, P. (in press).  The Impact of the Spezzino judgment for third sector organisations. European Procurement &











This article is brought to you by Swansea University. Any person downloading material is agreeing to abide by the
terms of the repository licence. Authors are personally responsible for adhering to publisher restrictions or conditions.
When uploading content they are required to comply with their publisher agreement and the SHERPA RoMEO
database to judge whether or not it is copyright safe to add this version of the paper to this repository. 
http://www.swansea.ac.uk/iss/researchsupport/cronfa-support/ 
  Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2663087 
1 
The	  impact	  of	  the	  Spezzino	  judgment	  for	  third	  sector	  organisations	  
	  





This	  paper	  analyses	  the	  potential	   implications	  that	  the	  Spezzino	  case2	  may	  have	  for	  
third	  sector	  organisations	  wishing	  to	  take	  part	  in	  the	  public	  procurement	  of	  certain	  service	  
contracts.	   The	   Court	   of	   Justice	   of	   the	   EU	   (CJEU)	   held	   as	   admissible	   in	   Spezzino	   to	   award	  
directly	   and	   on	   a	   preferential	   basis	   some	   service	   contracts	   to	   not-­‐for	   profit	   organisations	  
compliant	   with	   certain	   requirements.	   This	   decision	   by	   the	   CJEU	   constitutes	   a	   major	  
derogation	  of	   the	  principles	  of	  Articles	  49	   (freedom	  of	  establishment)	  and	  56	   (freedom	  of	  
services)	  of	  the	  TFEU.3	  	  	  	  	  
The	   paper	   is	   structured	   around	   the	   requirements	   established	   by	   CJEU	   in	  Spezzino,	  
the	  impact	  it	  may	  have	  on	  third	  sector	  organisations	  across	  the	  EU	  and	  its	  relationship	  going	  
forward	  with	  Directive	   2014/24/EU,	   particularly	   the	   new	   “light	   touch	   regime”	   for	   specific	  
categories	   of	   contracts.	   This	   paper	   argues	   that	   the	   scope	   for	   impact	   on	   third	   sector	  
organisations	   is	  smaller	  than	  anticipated	  at	  first	  glance.	  The	  exception	  created	  by	  Spezzino	  
only	   applies	   to	   contracts	   subject	   to	   primary	   EU	   law,	   that	   is	   contracts	  with	   a	   cross-­‐border	  
interest	   but	   not	   covered	   by	   either	   Directive	   2004/18/EC	   or	   Directive	   2014/24/EU.	  
Furthermore,	   the	   grounds	   for	   the	   exception	   need	   to	   be	   interpreted	   restrictively.	   In	  
consequence,	  going	  forward	   it	   is	  arguable	  that	   it	  only	  applies	  to	  all	  emergency	  ambulance	  
service	   contracts,	   as	   these	   are	   explicitly	   excluded	   from	  Directive	   2014/24/EU,	   and	   urgent	  
ambulance	  service	  contracts	  with	  a	  value	  under	  €750,000	  and	  a	  cross-­‐border	  interest.	  
	  
	  
2.	  Scope	  of	  Spezzino	  ruling	  for	  third	  sector	  organisations	  
	  
The	  details	  of	  the	  Spezzino	  case	  have	  been	  explored	  elsewhere,4	  but	  it	  is	  relevant	  for	  
the	  purposes	  of	  this	  paper	  to	  mention	  that	  the	  Spezzino	  case	  dealt	  with	  the	  acquisition	  of	  
emergency	   and	   urgent	   ambulance	   services.	   In	   more	   detail,	   in	   Spezzino	   it	   was	   held	   that	  
directly	  awarding	  urgent	  and	  emergency	  ambulance	  services	  to	  voluntary	  organisations,	  as	  
allowed	  for	  by	  the	  Italian	  Constitution,	  is	  within	  the	  exception	  granted	  to	  Member	  States	  on	  
the	  grounds	  of	  public	  health,	  in	  accordance	  with	  Sodemare5,	  Stamatelaki6	  and	  Commission	  v	  
Germany.7	  	  
                     
1	  Senior	  Lecturer	  in	  Law,	  Swansea	  University	  College	  of	  Law	  (p.telles@swansea.ac.uk).	  
2	  Azienda	  sanitaria	  locale	  n.5	  “Spezzino”	  and	  Others,	  C-­‐113/13,	  EU:C:2014:2240	  
3	  Consolidated	  version	  of	  the	  Treaty	  on	  the	  Functioning	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  [2012]	  OJ	  C	  326/308.	  
4	   A	   Aschieri,	   “Legal	   and	   factual	   background	   of	   the	   Spezzingo	   Judgment	   (C-­‐113/13):	   inconsistencies	   and	  
advantages	  of	  the	  special	  role	  played	  by	  voluntary	  associations	  in	  the	  working	  of	  the	  Italian	  social	  protection	  
systems”,	   on	   this	   EPPPL	   and	   D	   McGowan,	   “Does	   the	   Reservation	   of	   Ambulance	   Services	   to	   Voluntary	  
Organisations	  on	  a	  Cost	  Reimbursement	  Basis	  Give	  Rise	  to	  a	  Public	  Service	  Contract?	  Case	  C-­‐113/13,	  Azienda	  
Sanitaria	  Locale	  No.	  5	   ‘Spezzino’	  v	  San	  Lorenzo	  Società	  Cooperativa	  Sociale”	  (2015)	  24(3)	  Public	  Procurement	  
Law	  Review	  NA61-­‐NA66.	  
5	  Case	  C-­‐70/95,	  EU:C:1997:301.	  
6	  Case	  C-­‐444/05,	  EU:C:2007:231.	  
7	  Case	  C-­‐141/07,	  EU:C:2008:492.	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2 
The	   Spezzino	   case	   constitutes	   a	   clear	   and	   visible	   exception	   to	   at	   least	   two	   well	  
understood	   EU	   freedoms:	   freedom	   of	   establishment	   and	   freedom	   of	   service,	   contained	  
respectively	  in	  Articles	  49	  and	  56	  TFEU.8	  As	  an	  exception	  to	  general	  principles,	  a	  restrictive	  
interpretation	   is	   the	   correct	   way	   to	   interpret	   it,9	   thus	   meaning	   that	   any	   violation	   of	   EU	  
treaty	  principles	  needs	  to	  be	  kept	  to	  the	  bare	  minimum	  to	  achieve	  the	  aim	  set	  forth	  by	  the	  
Court.	  A	  restrictive	   interpretation	   limits	  the	  scope	  of	  scenarios	  where	  this	  exception	  could	  
be	  applicable	  and	  the	  potential	  implications	  it	  can	  have	  for	  third	  sector	  organisations.10	  	  
The	  Spezzino	   decision	  was	   specifically	   about	  how	   third	   sector	  organisations	   should	  
be	   treated	   in	   the	   “acquisition”	   of	   some	   service	   contracts,	   provided	   they	   complied	   with	  
certain	   requirements.	   The	   Court	   held	   that	   it	   was	   lawful	   to	   effectively	   exclude	   the	  
procurement	  of	  those	  service	  contracts	  from	  the	  TFEU	  treaty	  principles	  if	  certain	  conditions	  
were	  met.	  The	  conditions	  set	  in	  the	  ruling	  are:	  
	  
I)	  that	  services	  are	  for	  urgent	  and	  emergency	  ambulance	  services,	  	  
	  
II)	   to	  be	  awarded	  to	  voluntary	  associations	  whose	   legal	  and	  contractual	   framework	  
contributes	   to	   the	   social	   purpose,	   and	   the	   pursuit	   of	   the	   objectives	   of	   the	   good	   of	   the	  
community,	  
	  
III)	  in	  compliance	  with	  budgetary	  efficiency.	  	  
	  
2.1	  Urgent	  and	  emergency	  ambulance	  services	  
	  
The	   first	   element	   of	   the	   Spezzino	   ruling	   extends	   its	   coverage	   only	   to	   urgent	   and	  
emergency	   ambulance	   services	   as	   they	   are	   considered	   to	   be	   “Part	   B”11	   services	   and,	  
consequently,	   excluded	   from	   the	   application	   of	   the	   bulk	   of	   Part	   A	   rules	   of	   Directive	  
2004/18/EC.	  Under	  Directive	  2004/18/EC	  most	  public	  contracts	  are	  subject	  to	  Part	  A	  rules,	  
whereas	   a	   few	   are	   subject	   to	   Part	   B	   only,	   including	   some	  medical	   transport	   ones.	   As	   the	  
situation	   at	   hand	   involved	   mixed	   contracts,	   the	   Court	   concluded12	   that	   if	   the	   transport	  
                     
8	  Advocate	  General	  Wahl	  on	  its	  conclusion	  adopted	  an	  opposing	  view,	  considering	  that	  national	  law	  provisions	  
need	  to	  comply	  with	  Articles	  49	  and	  56	  TFEU	  as	  well	  as	  Directive	  2004/18/EC,	  cfr	  Opinion	  of	  Advocate	  General	  
Wahl	  of	  30	  April	  2014	  in	  Azienda	  sanitaria	  locale	  n.	  5	  «Spezzino»	  and	  Others,	  C-­‐113/13,	  EU:C:2014:291,	  para	  
76.	  
9	  On	  a	   similar	  note,	  Recital	   28	  of	  Directive	  2014/24/EU	  which	   is	   cited	  explicitly	  by	   the	  CJEU	   in	  paragraph	  8,	  
appears	  to	  exclude	  the	  application	  of	  the	  Directive	  to	  “certain	  emergency	  services	  where	  they	  are	  performed	  
by	  non-­‐profit	  organisations”	  states	  that	  “the	  exclusion	  should	  not	  be	  extended	  beyond	  that	  strictly	  necessary.”	  
10	   It	   has	   long	   been	   established	   in	   CJEU	   case	   law	   that	   third	   sector	   organisations	   are	   considered	   economic	  
operators	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  applying	  EU	  public	  procurement	  rules.	  For	  all,	  Commission	  v	  Italy	  Case	  C-­‐119/06	  
EU:C:2007:729	  and	  CoNISMa	  Case	  C-­‐305/98	  EU:C:2009:807,	  para	  52.	  As	   for	   the	   impact	  of	   the	  third	  sector	   in	  
the	   economy	   in	   general,	   in	   the	   UK	   it	   is	   estimated	   that	   it	   adds	   £11.8	   billion	   in	   Gross	   Value	   Added	   to	   the	  
economy	  and	  and	  the	  total	  yearly	  output	  of	  volunteers	   is	  estimated	  at	  £23.9	  billion,	  according	  to	  Data	   from	  
the	   National	   Council	   for	   Voluntary	   Organisations:	   http://data.ncvo.org.uk/a/almanac14/what-­‐is-­‐the-­‐sectors-­‐
contribution-­‐to-­‐the-­‐economy/,	   accessed	   July,12th	   2015	   and	   Cabinet	   Office,	   (2013)Community	   Life	   Survey	  
Report.	  
11	  The	  correct	  distinction	  is	  between	  Annex	  II	  A	  and	  Annex	  II	  B	  services,	  although	  they	  are	  colloquially	  known	  as	  
“Part	  A”	  and	  “Part	  B”	  services	  respectively.	  
12	   In	   accordance	   with	   prior	   case	   law	   such	   as	   Commission	   v	   Ireland	   case	   C-­‐507/03,	   EU:C:2007:676	   and	  
Commission	  v	  Ireland	  case	  C-­‐226/09,	  EU:C:2010:697.	  
3 
element	  value	  exceeded	  the	  value	  of	  the	  medical	  services,13	  then	  the	  contract	  would	  have	  
been	   subject	   to	  Part	  A	   rules14	  and	   the	  exception	  would	  not	  apply.	   In	   consequence,	  under	  
Directive	  2014/18/EC	  only	  Part	  B	  services	  could	  give	  rise	  to	  the	  application	  of	  exception.15	  
The	  Court	  considered	  as	  well	  that	  “contracts	  for	  the	  services	  referred	  to	  in	  Annex	  II	  B	  are,	  in	  
principle,	  in	  the	  light	  of	  their	  specific	  nature,	  not	  of	  sufficient	  cross-­‐border	  interest	  to	  justify	  
their	   award	  being	   subject	   to	   the	   conclusion	  of	   a	   tendering	   procedure	   intended	   to	   enable	  
undertakings	   from	   other	   Member	   States	   to	   examine	   the	   contract	   notice	   and	   submit	   a	  
tender.”16	   The	   Court	   added,	   correctly,	   that	   Part	   B	   contracts	   are	   subject	   to	   primary	   law,	  
particularly	   Articles	   49	   and	   56	   of	   TFEU,	   building	   from	   then	   onwards	   the	   argument	   that	  
would	  justify	  setting	  aside	  those	  EU	  principles.17	  	  
What	  the	  Court	  did	  not	  do	  on	  its	  decision,	  was	  setting	  aside	  Part	  A	  rules	  in	  Directive	  
2004/18/EC,	   nor	   did	   it	   made	   any	   reference	   which	   would	   allow	   us	   to	   conclude	   that	   the	  
Directive	  2004/18/EC	  could	  be	  set	  aside	  if	  it	  clashed	  with	  national	  provisions.	  It	  is	  interesting	  
to	  notice	  that	  while	  the	  Court	  had	  no	  qualms	  in	  setting	  aside	  the	  primary	   law,	   it	  refrained	  
from	   doing	   the	   same	   for	   the	   secondary	   source.	   And	   here	   lies	   a	   crucial	   finding	   about	  
Spezzino:	  it	  only	  applies	  to	  contracts	  covered	  by	  primary	  law	  only.18	  	  
The	  scope	  question	  remains	  valid	  however	  for	  other	  analogous	  contracts	  related	  to	  
public	  health	  and	  social	   security	   systems	   that	  are	  not	  covered	  by	  Directive	  2004/18/EC	  or	  
Directive	   2014/24/EU,19	   that	   is	   contracts	   below-­‐thresholds	   but	   with	   a	   cross-­‐border	  
interest.20	  These	  contracts	  would	  be	  subject	  to	  primary	   law,	  thus	   liable	  for	  being	  set	  aside	  
due	   to	  national	  considerations.	  However,	  as	  mentioned	   in	  Section	  2	  above,	   restrictions	   to	  
EU	   principles	   should	   be	   interpreted	   restrictively	   therefore	   raising	   the	   question	   if	   it	   is	  
possible	  to	  extend	  the	  exception	  at	  all	  to	  analogous	  services	  with	  a	  value	  below	  that	  of	  the	  
financial	  thresholds.21	  
	  
2.2	  Specific	  requirements	  for	  voluntary	  organisations	  
	  
                     
13	  Following	  the	  previous	  decisions	  of	  Walter	  Tögel	  v	  Niederösterreichische	  Gebietskrankenkasse,	  Case	  C-­‐76/97	  
ECLI:EU:C:1998:432	  and	  Felix	  Swoboda	  GmbH	  v	  Österreichische	  Nationalbank	  Case	  C-­‐411/00	  
ECLI:EU:C:2002:660	  
14	  Spezzino,	  para	  34	  and	  more	  specifically	  41-­‐45,	  particularly	  the	  latter.	  
15	  Spezzino,	  para	  45.	  
16	  Spezzino,	  para	  42.	  With	  a	  similar	  view,	  A	  Semple,	  (2014)	  A	  practical	  guide	  to	  public	  procurement,	  paras	  1.36-­‐
1.41	   and	  R	   Caranta,	   (2014)	  Mapping	   the	  margins	   of	   EU	  public	   contracts	   law:	   covered,	  mixed,	   excluded	   and	  
special	   contracts	   in,	   F	   Lichere,	   R	   Caranta	   and	   S	   Treumer	   (eds)	   Modernising	   public	   procurement:	   the	   new	  
Directive,	  p.	  88	  –	  95.	  
17	  Under	  Article	  267	  TFEU,	  the	  CJEU	  could	  have	  interpreted	  the	  Directive	  2004/18/EC	  and	  restricted	  its	  field	  of	  
application,	  however	  it	  did	  not	  do	  so.	  
18	  It	  is	  almost	  as	  if	  the	  Court	  is	  recognising	  some	  sort	  of	  “indirect	  effect”	  or	  an	  obligation	  of	  interpreting	  
national	  law	  in	  accordance	  with	  Directive	  2004/18/EC,	  similar	  to	  Von	  Coulson,	  Case	  14/83	  [1984]	  ECR	  1891	  and	  
Marleasing	  Case	  C-­‐106/89	  [1991]	  ECR	  4135.	  
19	  On	  the	  specific	  issues	  raised	  by	  Directive	  2014/24/EU,	  please	  see	  section	  3	  below.	  
20	  On	  cross-­‐border	  interest,	  please	  see	  sub-­‐section	  4.3	  below.	  
21	  On	   a	   related	  note,	   Portugal	   apparently	   awarded	  without	   competition	   up	   to	   €125	  million	  worth	   of	   health	  
service	   contracts	   to	   various	   third-­‐sector	   organisations	   for	   a	   five-­‐year	   period,	   leading	   to	   a	   complaint	   by	   the	  
Portuguese	   Association	   of	   Private	   Hospitals	   on	   the	   illegality	   of	   the	   decision	   and	   the	   “cartelisation	   of	   the	  
Portuguese	  Health	   Service”.	   Looking	   at	   the	   values	   referred	   to	   in	   the	  national	   press	   it	   appears	   the	   contracts	  
should	  have	  prima	  facie	  been	  covered	  by	  Directive	  2014/24/EU,	  although	  a	  firmer	  conclusion	  depends	  on	  the	  
analysis	  of	  the	  contracts	  themselves.	  
4 
The	   second	   compliance	   element	   of	   Spezzino	   is	   the	   need	   for	   economic	   operators	  
benefiting	  from	  the	  contract	  to	  comply	  with	  a	  number	  of	  requirements	  on	  its	  organisation	  
and	  objectives.	  First,	  only	  voluntary	  organisations	  are	  eligible	  to	  be	  awarded	  contracts	  under	  
the	  Spezzino	  exception.	  Profit-­‐making	  economic	  operators	  need	  not	  apply	  as	  the	  whole	  legal	  
argument	  created	  by	  the	  CJEU	  is	  based	  on	  the	  premise	  of	  their	  ineligibility.22	  	  But	  not	  all	  and	  
every	   voluntary	   organisation	   will	   be	   an	   eligible	   economic	   operator	   under	   Spezzino,	   only	  
those	  whose	  legal	  and	  contractual	  framework	  contributes	  to	  (a)	  the	  social	  purpose	  and	  (b)	  
the	   pursuit	   of	   the	   objectives	   of	   the	   good	   of	   the	   community	   are	   allowed	   to	   benefit.	   As	  
suggested	   before,	   all	   the	   requirements	   for	   the	   exception	   to	   be	   applicable	   should	   be	  
interpreted	  restrictively	  and	  this	  is	  no	  exception.	  	  
	  
The	  social	  purpose	  and	  the	  pursuit	  of	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  good	  of	  the	  community	  
	  
The	  first	  sub-­‐element	  of	  this	  requirement	  is	  that	  the	  legal	  and	  contractual	  framework	  
of	  the	  voluntary	  organisation	  needs	  to	  have	  a	  social	  purpose	  which	  pursues	  the	  objectives	  of	  
the	  good	  of	  the	  community.	  How	  should	  this	  requirement	  be	  interpreted?	  	  
First,	  even	  though	  its	  exact	  scope	  may	  be	  difficult	  to	  determine	  across	  the	  board	  and	  
for	  all	  Member	  States,	  it	  appears	  safe	  to	  argue	  that	  it	  has	  to	  be	  more	  than	  simply	  a	  not-­‐for	  
profit	  objective.23	  Had	  the	  court	  wanted	  to	  be	   liberal	  with	  the	  scope	  of	  entities	  that	  could	  
benefit	   from	   this	   treatment,	   then	   it	   would	   have	   simply	   referred	   to	   not-­‐for	   profit	   entities	  
instead	  of	  requiring	  a	  social	  purpose	  connected	  with	  the	  good	  of	  the	  community.	  In	  fact,	  the	  
Court	  was	  adamant	  that	  a	  measure	  of	  social	  purpose	  was	  required	  24	  but	  did	  not	  provide	  any	  
further	   indication	  of	  what	  would	  constitute	  said	  “social	  purpose”.	  The	  question,	   therefore	  
remains:	  how	  do	  we	  interpret	  the	  social	  purpose	  element?	  This	  will	  probably	  depend	  from	  
country	  to	  country	  and	  how	  each	  jurisdiction	  recognises	  and	  organises	  the	  third	  sector.	  The	  
author	  does	  only	  know	  the	  experience	  in	  two	  Member	  States	  (UK	  and	  Portugal)	  and	  these	  
are	  the	  ones	  he	  will	  refer	  to.	  	  
In	  the	  UK,	  we	  would	  have	  to	  distinguish	  generic	  not-­‐for	  profit	  entities	  from	  charities.	  
Anyone	  can	  create	  a	  not-­‐for	  profit	   company	  without	   share	  capital	   for	  example,25	  but	   that	  
does	   not	   imply	   an	   automatic	   compliance	   with	   the	   social	   purpose	   requirement.	   There	   is,	  
however,	   a	   specific	   type	   of	   not-­‐for	   profit	   entity	   that	   would	   fit	   the	   social	   purpose	  
requirement:	  charities.	  All	  charities	  have	  to	  be	  registered	  with	  the	  Charity	  Commission	  and	  
need	  to	  have	  “charitable	  purposes	  for	  the	  public	  benefit”.26	  Registration	  cannot	  be	  accepted	  
without	   those	  charitable	  purposes	  and	  effectively	  without	   registration	   there	   is	  no	  charity.	  
The	  Charity	  Act	  2011	  includes	  a	  detailed	  list	  of	  what	  constitutes	  a	  charitable	  purpose	  and	  it	  
includes	  two	  that	  may	  be	  relevant	  for	  the	  topic	  of	  this	  paper:	  “the	  advancement	  of	  health	  or	  
the	   saving	   of	   lives”	   and	   “the	   promotion	   of	   the	   efficiency	   […]	   ambulance	   services”.27	  
Consequently,	   in	   theory	   it	  would	  be	  possible	   for	   charity	  ambulance	   services	   to	  operate	   in	  
the	   country	   and	   for	   contracting	   authorities	   to	   award	   contracts	   directly	   to	   them	   under	  
                     
22	  In	  fact,	  the	  Court	  makes	  specific	  reference	  to	  Sodemare	  in	  para	  58.	  
23	  With	  a	  similar	  view,	  R	  Caranta,	  “After	  Spezzino	  (Case	  C-­‐113/13):	  A	  major	  loophole	  allowing	  direct	  awards	  in	  
the	  social	  sector”,	  in	  this	  issue	  of	  the	  EPPPL.	  
24	  Spezzino,	  paras.	  59	  and	  60	  
25	  There	  is	  at	  least	  a	  not-­‐for	  profit	  electricity	  company	  in	  the	  country,	  for	  instance.	  While	  it	  does	  pursue	  social	  
and	  environmental	  goals	   it	  does	  not	  go	  further	  than	  this,	   thus	  being	  questionable	   if	   it	  would	  have	  the	  social	  
purpose	  required	  by	  Spezzino	  (even	  though	  it	  operates	  on	  a	  completely	  different	  field).	  
26	  Charity	  Act	  2011,	  section	  1.	  All	  public	  universities	  in	  the	  UK	  are	  charities	  for	  example.	  
27	  Charity	  Act	  2011,	  section	  2	  (d)	  and	  (l)	  
5 
Spezzino.	   As	   an	   example,	   the	   Air	   Ambulance	   Service	   and	   the	   Welsh	   Air	   Ambulance	  
Charitable	  Trust,	  both	  doing	  emergency	  medical	  transport,	  are	  registered	  as	  charities28	  and	  
could,	  in	  theory,	  benefit	  from	  the	  Spezzino	  exception.	  	  
In	   Portugal,	   emergency	   ambulance	   services	   are	   traditionally	   provided	  by	   voluntary	  
fire	  service	  associations,29	   	   in	  a	  structure	  analogous	  to	  what	   is	  done	   in	   Italy	  albeit	  without	  
similar	   constitutional	   underpinnings	   or	   protection.30	   In	   fact,	   the	   Patient	   Transport	  
Regulation	   (Portaria	  no	  1147/2001)	  explicitly	   reserves	  emergency	  patient	   transport	   to	   the	  
National	   Medical	   Emergency	   Institute,	   police,	   Portuguese	   Red	   Cross	   and	   voluntary	  
firefighter	  associations.31	  All	  other	  potential	  providers,	   for	  profit	  or	  not-­‐for-­‐profit,	  national	  
or	  foreign,	  are	  barred	  from	  the	  market.	  Additionally,	  both	  the	  Red	  Cross	  and	  the	  voluntary	  
firefighter	  association	  are	  not	  required	  to	  obtain	  a	  license	  for	  patient	  transport,	  contrary	  to	  
any	  other	  operator.32	  	  
In	   consequence,	   the	   true	   subjective	   scope	   of	   Spezzino,	   ie	   the	   entities	   that	   are	  
positively	   affected	   by	   the	   decision,	  will	   depend	   on	   how	   each	  Member	   State	   organises	   its	  
third	  sector	  and	  the	  characteristics	  of	  each	  voluntary	  organisation.	  
	  	  	  
2.3	  Budgetary	  efficiency	  	  
	  
The	  third	  Spezzino	  requirement	  is	  budgetary	  efficiency.	  Out	  of	  all	  the	  requirements,	  
this	   appears	   to	   be	   most	   confusing,	   although	   a	   similar	   argument	   was	   made	   in	   Sodemare	  
before.	  From	  the	  decision,	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  argumentation	  presented	  by	  the	  Court,	  one	  must	  
infer	  that	  sthe	  Court	  equates	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  voluntary	  association	  will	  only	  obtain	  a	  cost	  
reimbursement	   with	   budgetary	   efficiency.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   Court	   appears	   to	   be	  
convinced	   that	   an	   entity	  with	   a	   profit	  motive	   cannot	   be	   as	   budgetary	   efficient	   (cheaper)	  
than	  a	  not-­‐for	  profit	  entity	  that	  it	  is	  only	  asking	  for	  its	  costs	  to	  be	  covered.	  Sanchez-­‐Graells	  
deals	  with	  this	  matter	  in	  detail,33	  but	  some	  further	  thoughts	  are	  appropriate	  here.	  	  
First,	   the	  Court	   appears	   to	   ignore	   that	   competition,	   in	   general,	   forces	  providers	   to	  
become	  more	  efficient,	  irrespective	  of	  the	  underlying	  nature	  of	  the	  entity	  (profit	  or	  not-­‐for-­‐
profit).	   Actually,	   the	   Court	   may	   be	   tacitly	   admitting	   this	   fact	   by	   mentioning	   “budgetary	  
efficiency”	  instead	  of	  “economic	  efficiency”	  or	  any	  other	  similar	  expression	  commonly	  used	  
                     
28	  Registration	  numbers	  1098874	  and	  1083645	  respectively.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  Air	  Ambulance	  Service,	  The	  Air	  
Ambulance	  Foundation	  UK	  is	  also	  registered	  as	  a	  charity	  with	  activities	  are	  “the	  relief	  of	  sickness	  and	  injury	  and	  
protection	  of	  life	  by	  providing	  financial	  support	  to	  air	  ambulance	  services	  […]”,	  emphasis	  by	  the	  author.	  Charity	  
Commission	   Website	   search,	   conducted	   July	   28th.	   This	   split	   structure	   between	   the	   entity	   providing	   the	  
services	   and	   a	   funding	   body	   appears	   to	   be	   relatively	   common	   in	   the	   country.	  Other	   examples	   are	   the	  NHS	  
trusts	   which	   themselves	   are	   not	   registered	   as	   charities,	   but	   have	   set	   up	   associated	   charities	   for	   funding	  
purposes.	  
29	   Although	   the	   National	   Medical	   Emergency	   Institute	   has	   a	   67%	   market	   share,	   the	   remaining	   33%	   are	  
undertaken	  exclusively	  by	  voluntary	  associations,	  under	  specific	  circumstances,	  voluntary	  associations	  market	  
share	   reaches	  81%	  of	   the	   total,	   Entidade	  Reguladora	  da	   Saude,	  Estudo	  e	  Avaliacao	  do	   Sector	  do	  Transporte	  
Terrestre	  de	  Doentes,	  2007	  p.58-­‐61,	  particularly	  graphs	  22	  and	  23.	  
30	  Neither	  patient	  nor	  ambulance	  transport	  services	  are	  mentioned	  in	  Article	  64	  of	  the	  Constitution,	  dedicated	  
to	  the	  health	  sector.	  
31	  Although	  there	   is	  no	  distinction	  based	  on	  type	  of	   transport	  service	  or	  explicit	   set	  aside	  under	  Decree-­‐Law	  
38/92,	  which	  regulates	  patient	  transport.	  
32	   Law	   12/97	   Article	   1.	   However,	   they	   are	   under	   obligation	   by	   Article	   2	   to	   provide	   the	   National	   Medical	  
Emergency	  Institute	  with	  detailed	  information	  about	  their	  organisation.	  
33	  A	  Sanchez-­‐Graells,	  “Competition	  and	  state	  aid	  implications	  of	  the	  Spezzino	  Judgment	  (C-­‐113/13):	  the	  scope	  
for	  inconsistency	  in	  assessing	  support	  for	  public	  services	  voluntary	  organisations”,	  in	  this	  EPPPL	  issue.	  
6 
in	  public	  procurement,	  such	  as	  the	  most	  economically	  advantageous	  tender.	  Furthermore,	  
this	   lack	  of	   competition	  may	  encourage	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  entities	   to	  become	  non-­‐competitive	  
cost	   wise,	   ie	   the	   costs	   (particularly	   overheads)	   may	   rise	   over	   time	   and	   end	   up	   being	  
significantly	  higher	  in	  comparison	  with	  a	  for-­‐profit	  provider.	  A	  modicum	  of	  competition	  may	  
be	  enough	  to	  keep	  them	  running	  more	  efficiently.	  Without	  competition	  on	  the	   long	  run	   it	  
becomes	  impossible	  for	  the	  contracting	  to	  benchmark	  a	  price	  against	  any	  efficiency	  metric,	  
irrespective	  once	  more	  of	  the	  economic	  operator’s	  business	  structure.	  Ironically,	  in	  Portugal	  
the	  Health	  Regulator	  Authority	  produced	  a	  report	  in	  2007	  suggesting	  that	  allowing	  for	  profit	  
operators	  or	  even	  new	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  operators	   to	  participate	   in	   the	  market	  of	  emergency	  
patient	   transport	   could	   improve	   the	   quality	   of	   service,34	   and	   one	   would	   expect	   with	  
improved	  “budgetary	  efficiency”.	  Eight	  years	  on,	  no	  economic	  operator	  eligibility	  rules	  were	  
changed	  so	  far.	  
Second,	  do	  not-­‐for	  profit	  economic	  operators	  need	  this	  kind	  of	  protection	  from	  the	  
Court	  in	  the	  first	  place	  to	  win	  contracts?	  By	  definition	  voluntary	  associations	  are	  staffed	  at	  
least	  partly	  by	  voluntaries	  which	  do	  not	  draw	  a	  salary	  and	  as	  such	  gives	   the	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  
economic	   operator	   an	   immediate	   cost	   advantage.35	   At	   least	   in	   the	   UK	   this	   advantage	   is	  
compounded	   by	   various	   tax	   benefits	   available	   for	   charities.36	   It	   may	   be	   that	   indeed,	  
voluntary	  associations	  may	  be	  the	  most	  “budgetary	  efficient”	  way	  of	  delivering	  urgent	  and	  
emergency	  medical	  ambulance	  services.	  But	  without	  proper	  competition	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  
be	  certain	  and	  this	  author	  remains	  sceptical.37	  
	  
	  
3.	  The	  scope	  of	  Spezzino	  for	  third	  sector	  organisations	  under	  Directive	  2014/24/EU	  
	  
The	   CJEU	   mentions	   Directive	   2014/24/EU	   explicitly	   in	   the	   Spezzino	   decision	   to	  
recognise	  that	  emergency	  transport	  services	  are	  excluded	  from	  its	  application	  due	  to	  Article	  
10(h)	   and	   Recital	   28.38	   It	   is	   not	   clear	   why	   the	   Court	   stopped	   its	   analysis	   of	   Directive	  
2014/24/EU	  there	  and	  did	  not	  look	  into	  the	  new	  “light	  touch	  regime”	  chapter	  applicable	  to	  
social	   and	   other	   services39	   of	   Articles	   74	   to	   77.	   This	   is	   an	   important	   point	   to	   make	   as	  
Directive	   2014/24/EU	  makes	   do	  with	   the	   Part	   A/B	   distinction,	   replacing	   it	  with	   this	   “light	  
touch	  regime”	  which	  is	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  Directive.	  In	  consequence,	  contracts	  covered	  
by	   the	  “light	   touch	  regime”	  are	  bona	   fide	  regulated	  by	  Directive	  2014/24/EU	  albeit	  with	  a	  
                     
34	  Entidade	  Reguladora	  da	  Saude,	  Estudo	  e	  Avaliacao	  do	  Sector	  do	  Transporte	  Terrestre	  de	  Doentes,	  p.	  21	  and	  
56-­‐57.	  
35	   Though	   in	   the	   past	   the	   Court	   has	   not	   seen	   this	   as	   detrimental	   to	   competition,	   Case	   C-­‐94/99	   Arge	  
Gewasserschutz	  vs	  Bundesministerium	  fur	  Land-­‐	  und	  Forstwirtschaft	  ECLI:EU:C:2000:677.	  
36	  A	  report	  in	  Wales	  found	  that	  charities	  were	  pricing	  out	  for	  profit	  retailers	  from	  Welsh	  high	  streets	  due	  to	  a	  
combination	   of	   tax	   benefits	   such	   as	   not	   paying	   business	   rates,	   voluntary	   workforce	   and	   “free”	   stock.	   In	  
consequence,	  this	  led	  to	  a	  reduced	  shop	  diversity	  on	  high	  streets	  in	  Wales,	  Welsh	  Government,	  Business	  Rate	  
Relief	   for	  Charities	  Social	  Enterprises	  and	  Credit	  Unions,	  2013,	  Recommendation	  18.	  Furthermore,	  an	  earlier	  
report	   by	   the	   Business	   Rates	   Task	   and	   Finish	   Group	   recommended	   tighter	   qualifying	   criteria	   such	   as	  
philanthropic,	  providing	  social	  or	  community	  benefit,	   rather	   than	  simply	  being	  a	  charity,	   for	   the	  purposes	  of	  
business	  rates	  benefits,	  Business	  Rates	  Review	  (2012),	  Recommendation	  15.	  
37	  With	  similar	  concerns,	  R	  Caranta,	  “After	  Spezzino	  (Case	  C-­‐113/13):	  A	  major	  loophole	  allowing	  direct	  awards	  
in	  the	  social	  sector”,	  in	  this	  issue	  of	  the	  EPPPL.	  
38	  Spezzino,	  para	  8.	  
39	  Directive	  2014/24/EU	  Articles	  74	  through	  77.	  
7 
reduced	  set	  of	  obligations.40	  Therefore,	  the	  argument	  presented	  by	  the	  CJEU	  that	  urgent	  and	  
emergency	  services	  are	  only	  subject	  to	  primary	  law,	  is	  no	  longer	  entirely	  true	  as	  at	  least	  the	  
urgent	  ambulance	  services	  are	  covered	  by	  secondary	  law	  for	  the	  reasons	  put	  forward	  in	  this	  
section.	  
	  
3.1	  Article	  10(h)	  and	  Recital	  28	  
	  
Article	  10	  of	  Directive	  2014/24/EU	  deals	  with	  various	  exclusions	  to	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  
Directive.	   It	   does	   also	   restrict	   the	   exclusions	   that	  would	   otherwise	   be	   applicable	   to	   some	  
contracts.	  Under	  Article	  10(h)	  patient	  transport	  ambulance	  services	  covered	  by	  the	  Common	  
Procurement	  Vocabulary	  (CPV)41	  code	  85143000-­‐3	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  included	  within	  the	  
scope	  of	  application	  of	   the	  Directive.	  As	   such,	  we	  can	  safely	  establish	   that	  general	  patient	  
transport	  ambulance	  services	  are	  indeed	  subject	  to	  Directive	  2014/24/EU.	  In	  consequence,	  
contracting	   authorities	   wishing	   to	   award	   contracts	   covered	   by	   the	   CPV	   code	   85143000-­‐3	  
must	  comply	  with	  the	  Directive	  obligations,	  namely	  the	  “light	  touch	  regime”	  of	  Articles	  74	  to	  
77.	  
There	   may	   be,	   however,	   an	   exception	   to	   the	   rule	   above:	   Recital	   28	   of	   the	   new	  
Directive	   establishes	   that	   “emergency	   services	   where	   they	   are	   performed	   by	   non-­‐profit	  
organisations	  or	  associations”	  are	  not	  subject	  to	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  Directive.	  The	  extent	  of	  this	  
exclusion	  will	  depend	  on	  how	  we	  value	  the	  Recital.	  Usually,	  Directive	  Recitals	  are	  to	  be	  used	  
to	  interpret	  Articles	  in	  case	  there	  are	  doubts	  about	  their	  scope.	  However,	  looking	  at	  Article	  
10(h)	   there	   is	  no	  doubt	  whatsoever	  that	  all	   services	  covered	  by	  the	  CPV	  code	  85143000-­‐3	  
are	  within	   the	   scope	   of	   the	  Directive.	   It	   follows	   from	   the	   argument	   that	   if	   the	   lawmaker	  
wanted	   to	  exclude	  emergency	   services	   from	  Directive’s	  2014/24/EU	  scope,	   it	   should	  have	  
included	   said	   exclusion	   within	   Article	   10	   and	   not	   on	   Recital	   28.	   As	   such,	   Recital	   28	   is	  
inconsistent	  with	  Article	  10	  and	   the	  normative	  nature	  of	   the	   latter	   takes	  precedence.	  The	  
consequence	  of	  this	  line	  of	  thought	  is	  that	  the	  CJEU	  was	  wrong	  on	  its	  joint	  interpretation	  of	  
Article	   10(h)	   and	   Recital	   28	   and	   that	   the	   Spezzino	   exception	   only	   applies	   to	   urgent	   and	  
emergency	   ambulance	   service	   contracts	   with	   a	   value	   below-­‐thresholds	   and	   cross-­‐border	  
interest.	  This	   represents	  a	  significant	   reduction	   in	   the	  scope	  of	  application	  of	   the	  ruling	   in	  
comparison	  with	  Directive	  2004/18/EC.	  
Even	  if	  we	  admit	  as	  the	  CJEU	  did	  that	  Recital	  28	  is	  relevant	  for	  the	  interpretation	  of	  
Article	  10(h)	  it	  does	  refer	  only	  to	  emergency	  services,	  thus	  meaning	  that	  urgent	  services	  are	  
still	   covered	   by	   Directive	   2014/24/EU.	   In	   fact,	   under	   this	   argumentation	   the	   Spezzino	  
exception	  would	   apply	   always	   to	   emergency	   services,	   as	   all	   contracts	   are	   only	   subject	   to	  
primary	   law,	   but	   for	   urgent	   services	   it	   would	   apply	   only	   to	   contracts	   valued	   below-­‐
thresholds.	  
	  It	   has	   been	   argued	   that	   perhaps	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   judgement	  may	   be	  wider	   than	  
simply	   for	   emergency	   ambulance	   services	   as	   the	   Court	   considered	   the	   Italian	   legal	  
arrangements	   as	   compatible	   with	   the	   principles	   of	   equal	   treatment	   and	   non-­‐
discrimination.42	  However,	  as	  mentioned	  at	  the	  start	  of	  this	  subsection,	  the	  first	  element	  of	  
                     
40	  With	   a	   similar	   view,	   R	   Caranta,	   (2014)	  Mapping	   the	  margins	   of	   EU	   public	   contracts	   law:	   covered,	  mixed,	  
excluded	  and	  special	  contracts	  in,	  F	  Lichere,	  R	  Caranta	  and	  S	  Treumer	  (eds)	  Modernising	  public	  procurement:	  
the	  new	  Directive,	  p.	  88	  –	  95.	  
41	  Regulation	  EC	  No	  2195/2002	  as	  amended	  by	  Commission	  Regulation	  EC	  no	  213/2008.	  
42	   D	   McGowan,	   “Does	   the	   Reservation	   of	   Ambulance	   Services	   to	   Voluntary	   Organisations	   on	   a	   Cost	  
Reimbursement	  Basis	  Give	  Rise	   to	   a	   Public	   Service	  Contract?	  Case	  C-­‐113/13,	  Azienda	   Sanitaria	   Locale	  No.	   5	  
8 
the	   Spezzino	   ruling	   is	   that	   it	   applies	   to	   emergency	   ambulance	   services,	   which	   under	   the	  
Directive	  2014/24/EU	  have	  been	  explicitly	  excluded	  from	  its	  scope.	  In	  the	  author’s	  view,	  the	  
exception	   carved	   to	   the	   EU	   principles	   apply	   to	   emergency	   ambulance	   services	   and	   at	   a	  
maximum	  analogous	  services	  also	  excluded	  from	  the	  scope	  of	  Directive	  2014/24/EU.	  	  
	  
3.2	  The	  “light	  touch	  regime”	  
	  
Directive	   2014/24/EU	   includes	   in	   Articles	   74	   to	   77	   a	   “light	   touch	   regime”	   for	  
contracts	  mentioned	  in	  Anne	  XIV43	  and	  with	  a	  value	  higher	  than	  €750,000.	  In	  Annex	  XIV	  we	  
can	   find	   a	   “Health,	   social	   and	   related	   services”	   category	   which	   includes	   CPV	   85143000.	  
Therefore,	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  general	  ambulance	  services	  with	  a	  value	  above	  threshold	  
are	  to	  be	  tendered	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  “light	  touch	  regime”.	  This	  regime	  establishes	  a	  set	  
of	  guiding	  principles	  and	  rules	  that	  are	  applicable	  to	  the	  tendering	  of	  the	  contracts	  covered.	  
These	  Articles	  effectively	  guarantee	  a	  modicum	  of	  competition	  and	  respect	  for	  the	  principles	  
of	  equal	  treatment	  and	  non-­‐discrimination.44	  
Within	  the	  “light	  touch	  regime”	  Article	  77	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  in	  determining	  the	  
potential	  impact	  of	  Spezzino	  to	  the	  third	  sector	  organisations.	  This	  article	  lists	  a	  series	  of	  CPV	  
codes	   whose	   contracts	   can	   be	   reserved	   or	   “set	   aside”	   to	   organisations	   compliant	   with	  
certain	   conditions.	   The	   CPV	   85143000	   is	   amongst	   the	   ones	   listed	   in	   Article	   77,	   meaning	  
ambulance	  services	  are	  included	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  application	  of	  the	  “set	  aside”	  rules.	  	  
As	   for	   the	   eligibility	   requirements,	   paragraph	   2	   of	   Article	   77	   establishes	   the	  
conditions	  which	   are	   broadly	   in	   line	  with	  what	   one	  would	   expect	   from	   a	   “modern”	   third	  
sector	   organisation,	   i.e.	   pursuing	   a	   public	   service	   mission,	   reinvesting	   profits	   in	   the	  
organisation	  objective	   and	  having	   structures	  of	  ownership	  based	  on	  employee	  ownership,	  
participatory	   principles	   or	   require	   an	   active	   participation	   of	   employees,	   users	   and	  
stakeholders.	   It	   is	   not	   clear	   to	   the	   author	   though,	   if	   all	   the	   organisation	   covered	   by	   the	  
Spezzino	   requirements	   would	   fit	   within	   the	   constraints	   of	   paragraph	   2.	   Furthermore,	   this	  
paragraph	   includes	   another	   important	   limitation	   to	   the	   eligibility	   of	   organisations:	   they	  
cannot	  have	  been	  awarded	  a	  contract	  under	  this	  Article	  by	  the	  same	  contracting	  authority	  
within	  the	  last	  three	  years.	  As	  such,	  the	  contracting	  can	  still	  keep	  reserving	  contracts	  under	  
Article	  77	  but	  the	  previous	  awardee	  is	  not	  eligible	  to	  keep	  on	  providing	  the	  service.	  	  This	  is	  
an	  important	  concession	  to	  competition	  and	  one	  compounded	  with	  paragraph	  3	  which	  limits	  
the	  contract	  length	  to	  three	  years.	  
Had	  Spezzino	   been	   conceived	   instead	   around	   this	  Article,	   the	  damage	  done	   to	   the	  
principles	  of	  competition,	  equal	  treatment	  and	  non-­‐discrimination45	  would	  be	  smaller	  than	  
the	   actual	   decision.	   In	   any	   event,	   the	   “light	   touch	   regime”	   of	   Articles	   74	   to	   77	   and	  
                                                                
‘Spezzino’	  v	  San	  Lorenzo	  Società	  Cooperativa	  Sociale”	  (2015)	  24(3)	  Public	  Procurement	  Law	  Review	  NA65	  and	  A	  
Aschieri,	  “Legal	  and	  factual	  background	  of	  the	  Spezzingo	  Judgment	  (C-­‐113/13):	  inconsistencies	  and	  advantages	  
of	  the	  special	  role	  played	  by	  voluntary	  associations	  in	  the	  working	  of	  the	  Italian	  social	  protection	  systems”,	  in	  
this	  issue	  of	  the	  EPPPL.	  
43	  Directive	  2014/24/EU	  Article	  74.	  
44	   In	   addition	   to	   primary	   law,	   the	   principles	   of	   equal	   treatment	   and	   non-­‐discrimination	   are	   now	   explicitly	  
included	   in	   Article	   18	   of	   Directive	   2014/24/EU.	   In	   consequence,	   they	   cannot	   be	   set	   aside	   by	   the	   Spezzino	  
decision	  as	  they	  are	  now	  part	  of	  secondary	  law.	  	  
45	  This	  is	  due	  to	  the	  need	  to	  advertise	  a	  call	  for	  competition	  (paragraph	  4),	  limiting	  the	  maximum	  duration	  to	  3	  
years	  (paragraph	  3)	  and	  barring	  organisation	  which	  won	  a	  similar	  contract	  from	  the	  same	  contracting	  authority	  
under	  Article	  77	  within	  the	  last	  3	  years	  (paragraph	  2(d)	  
9 




4.	  General	  issues	  raised	  by	  Spezzino	  for	  third-­‐sector	  organisations	  
	  
The	   decision	   taken	   by	   the	   CJEU	   in	   Spezzino	   raises	   a	   number	   of	   issues	   that	   are	  
relevant	   in	   general	   for	   third-­‐sector	   organisations	   across	   the	   EU.	   These	   are	   both	  
theoretical/conceptual	   issues	  as	  well	  as	  practical.	  They	  are	  also	  relevant	  irrespective	  of	  the	  
exact	  scope	  of	  application	  of	  Spezzino,	  although	  a	  wider	  scope	  will	  increase	  their	  relevance.	  
	  
4.1	  Why	  allowing	  direct	  awards	  of	  contracts?	  
	  
The	  first	   issues	  that	   is	  relevant	  for	  third-­‐sector	  organisations	  is	  that	   in	  Spezzino,	  the	  
CJEU	   went	   further	   than	   simply	   setting	   aside	   contracts	   for	   a	   particular	   class	   of	   economic	  
operators.	   In	   fact,	   the	   Court	   jumped	   straight	   into	   allowing	   direct	   award	   of	   contracts	   to	  
members	  of	  a	  particular	  class	  of	  economic	  operators.46	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  this	  decision	  
does	  not	  pass	  the	  test	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  proportionality	  as	  it	  was	  not	  necessary	  to	  achieve	  
the	   stated	   aim	   of	   the	   decision:	   allowing	   the	  Member	   State	   to	   organise	   part	   of	   its	   health	  
sector	  by	  excluding	  for-­‐profit	  economic	  operators.	  In	  consequence,	  said	  objective	  could	  have	  
been	  achieved	  with	  reduced	  impact	  on	  principles	  of	  equal	  treatment	  and	  non-­‐discrimination	  
if	  the	  final	  outcome	  was	  simply	  the	  creation	  of	  reserved	  contracts.	  The	  same	  can	  be	  said	  of	  
the	  impact	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  competition:	  it	  would	  be	  less	  severely	  affected	  in	  this	  second	  
scenario.	   This	   proposal	   is	   consistent	   with	   the	   view	   expressed	   in	   section	   2.2	   that	   the	  
requirements	  for	  the	  Spezzino	  test	  should	  be	  interpreted	  restrictively.	  	  
In	  any	  case,	  the	  exclusion	  of	  application	  of	  the	  EU	  principles	  “cuts	  both	  ways.”	   It	   is	  
beneficial	  for	  the	  third	  sector	  economic	  operators	  getting	  the	  contracts	  directly	  as	  they	  do	  
so	  with	  reduced	  transaction	  costs	  (in	  comparison	  with	  a	  full	  blown	  tendering	  procedure)	  and	  
without	   competition.	   But	   there	   is	   a	   downside	   for	   third	   sector	   economic	   operators	   to	   this	  
protection	   from	  competition.	   Looking	   at	   the	   identity	  of	   the	   applicants	   in	   the	   Italian	   court	  
case	  which	   led	   to	  Spezzino	  highlights	   it:	  both	   the	  San	  Lorenzo	  Societa	  Cooperativa	  Sociale	  
and	  the	  Croce	  Verde	  Cogema	  are	  also	  national	  third	  sector	  economic	  operators.	  As	  such,	  it	  
can	  be	  argued	   that	   the	   ruling	  protects	   third	   sector	  economic	  operations	  where	   they	  have	  
inside	   access	   to	   key	   decision	   makers	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   all	   other	   national	   third	   sector	  
organisations	  which	  could,	   in	  theory,	  be	   interested	   in	  competing	  for	  those	  contracts.	  With	  
Spezzino	   some	  not-­‐for	  profit	   organisations	  will	   benefit	   from	   the	   reduced	   competition	   that	  
direct	   awarding	  of	   contracts	   brings,	   particularly	   the	  ones	  with	   insider	   access	   to	   the	  entity	  
awarding	  the	  contract.	  	  
In	  effect,	  the	  author	  would	  have	  preferred	  a	  more	  conservative	  approach	  by	  the	  CJEU	  
which	  upheld	  the	  principles	  of	  equal	  treatment	  and	  non-­‐discrimination	  at	  least	  for	  all	  eligible	  
third	  sector	  organisations	  national	  or	  otherwise.	  Having	  said	  that,	  if	  the	  Court	  really	  wanted	  
to	   reduce	   the	   transaction	   costs	   of	   national	   third	   sector	   organisations	   and	   protect	   the	  
discretion	  of	  Member	  States	  to	  organise	  certain	  features	  of	  its	  health	  systems,	  it	  might	  have	  
been	   preferable	   if	   it	   had	   gone	   even	   further	   and	   consider	   the	   repayment	   of	   emergency	  
ambulance	  service	  on	  a	  cost	  basis	  as	  grants	  instead	  of	  contracts	  being	  procured.	  
                     
46	  As	  suggested	  by	  R	  Caranta,	  “After	  Spezzino	  (Case	  C-­‐113/13):	  A	  major	  loophole	  allowing	  direct	  awards	  in	  the	  
social	  sector”,	  in	  this	  issue	  of	  the	  EPPPL.	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4.2	  What	  about	  third	  sector	  organisations	  based	  on	  other	  Member	  States?	  
	  
Connected	  with	   the	   first	   problem	  highlighted	   above	   is	   the	   specific	   impact	   on	   third	  
sector	   organisations	   based	   in	   other	   Member	   States.	   As	   highlighted	   by	   Aschieri47	   and	  
Sanchez-­‐Graells,48	   the	   Court	   went	   to	   great	   lengths49	   as	   to	   consider	   what	   would	   be	   the	  
implications	   if	   cross-­‐border	   interest	   existed	   as	   it	   was	   unclear	   from	   the	   referral	   by	   the	  
Consiglio	  di	  Stato	  if	  indeed	  certain	  cross-­‐border	  interest	  it	  was	  present	  or	  not.50	  	  	  
The	  Court	  held	  in	  para	  50	  and	  subsequently	  in	  the	  ruling,	  that	  if	  cross-­‐border	  interest	  
existed	  in	  the	  situation	  at	  hand,	  Italy	  was	  still	  free	  to	  regulate	  its	  health	  sector	  as	  it	  saw	  fit.	  
Caranta	  considers	   this	   conclusion	  by	   the	  Court	  as	  “drilling	  a	  big	  hole	   through	   the	   fabric	  of	  
public	   procurement	   rules.”51	   The	   consequence	   for	   third	   sector	   economic	   operators	   from	  
other	  Member	  States	   is	  that	  they	  will	  not	  be	  entitled	  to	  the	  protection	  offered	  by	  primary	  
EU	   law,	   particularly	   equal	   treatment	   and	   non-­‐discrimination.	   This	   approach	   is	   (partially)	  
consistent	  with	  Sodemare	  52	  where	   it	  was	  held	   that	  not-­‐profit	  making	  economic	  operators	  
were	   entitled	   to	   healthcare	   contracts	   whereby	   they	   were	   only	   being	   reimbursed	   of	   their	  
expenses.53	   In	  Sodemare,	   however	   the	  Court	   held	   that	   an	   undertaking	   established	  on	   the	  
territory	   of	   another	  Member	   State	   could	   not	   avail	   itself	   to	   EU	   law	   principles	   “cannot	   be	  
applied	   to	   activities	   which	   are	   confined	   in	   all	   respects	   within	   a	   single	   Member	   State”54	  
Sodemare,	   of	   course,	   predates	  Telaustria	   55	   and	   the	   subsequent	  body	  of	   case	   law	   created	  
around	   cross-­‐border	   interest,	   but	   it	   may	   be	   assumed	   that	   its	   ruling	   was	   meant	   to	   be	  
applicable	  in	  situations	  with	  limited	  connection	  to	  another	  Member	  State.	  Furthermore,	  as	  
argued	   by	   Advocate	   General	   Wahl,	   Sodemare	   did	   not	   address	   specifically	   public	  
procurement	  rules	  but	  the	  welfare	  system	  adopted	  by	  Lombardia,56	  a	  conclusion	  that	  could	  
be	   understood	   in	   case	   that	   cost	   reimbursements	   were	   not	   considered	   to	   be	   public	  
procurement	  contracts,	  which	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  the	  case	  in	  Sodemare.	  
	  
	  
                     
47	   A	   Aschieri,	   “Legal	   and	   factual	   background	   of	   the	   Spezzingo	   Judgment	   (C-­‐113/13):	   inconsistencies	   and	  
advantages	  of	  the	  special	  role	  played	  by	  voluntary	  associations	  in	  the	  working	  of	  the	  Italian	  social	  protection	  
systems”,	  on	  this	  EPPPL.	  
48	  A	  Sanchez-­‐Graells,	  “Competition	  and	  state	  aid	  implications	  of	  the	  Spezzino	  Judgment	  (C-­‐113/13):	  the	  scope	  
for	  inconsistency	  in	  assessing	  support	  for	  public	  services	  voluntary	  organisations”,	  in	  this	  EPPPL	  issue.	  
49	  Spezzino,	  paras	  45-­‐49	  
50	  Such	  as	  Commission	  v	  Ireland,	  EU:C:2007:	  676,	  para	  29;	  Commission	  v	  Italy,	  C-­‐412/04,	  EU:C:2008:102	  para	  66	  
and	   81,	   joined	   cases	   C-­‐147/06	   and	   C-­‐148/06	   SECAP	   and	   Santorso	   EU:C:2008:277	   para	   21;	   C-­‐376/08	  
EU:C:2009:808,	  para	  24	  or	  C-­‐226/09	  Commission	  v	  Ireland,	  EU:C:2010:697.	  Although	  what	  constitutes	  certain	  
cross-­‐border	   interest	   is	   not	   entirely	   settled	   and	   still	   follows	   a	   casuistic	   approach,	   see,	   C-­‐221/12	   Belgacom	  
EU:C:2013:736	  and	  C-­‐388/12	  Commune	  di	  Ancona	  OJ	  C	  295.	  With	  this	  view,	  P	  Telles,	  “The	  good,	  the	  bad	  and	  
the	   ugly”,	   Public	   Contract	   Law	   Journal	   43	   (2013)	   p.	   3-­‐29	   and	   P	   Bogdanowicz,	   “Cross-­‐border	   Interest	   and	  
Concession	  Contracts:	  a	  Critical	  Approach”,	  EPPL	  2	  (2015)	  p.83	  -­‐	  91.	  
51	  R	  Caranta,	  “After	  Spezzino	  (Case	  C-­‐113/13):	  A	  major	  loophole	  allowing	  direct	  awards	  in	  the	  social	  sector”,	  in	  
this	  issue	  of	  the	  EPPPL.	  
52	  Case	  C-­‐70./95	  Sodemare	  ECLI:EU:C:1997:301	  
53	  Sodemare,	  para	  49.	  
54	  Sodemare,	  para	  38.	  The	  general	  argument	  can	  be	  found	  in	  paras	  36-­‐40.	  
55	   Case	   C-­‐324/98	  Telaustria	   Verlags	  GmbH	  and	   Telefonadress	  GmbH	   v	   Telekom	  Austria	  AG,	   formerly	   Post	  &	  
Telekom	  Austria	  AG,	  2000	  ECR	  at	  I-­‐10770.	  
56	  Opinion	  of	  Advocate	  General	  Wahl	  of	  30	  April	  2014	  in	  Azienda	  sanitaria	  locale	  n.	  5	  «Spezzino»	  and	  Others,	  C-­‐
113/13,	  EU:C:2014:291,	  para	  71.	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4.3	   Separating	   urgent	   and	   emergency	   ambulance	   services	   from	   regular	   ambulance	  
services.	  
	  
In	  addition	  to	  conceptual	  or	  theoretical	   issues,	  Spezzino	  raises	  at	  least	  two	  practical	  
issues.	   The	   first	   is	   how	   to	   clearly	   and	   reliably	   identify	   urgent	   and	   emergency	   ambulance	  
services.	  Each	  contract	  above	  the	  EU	  thresholds	  is	  usually	  identified	  by	  the	  appropriate	  CPV	  
code.57	  These	  codes	  are	  consistent	  across	   the	  EU,	  providing	  a	  degree	  of	  harmonisation	  on	  
contract	   identification.	   By	   restricting	   the	   exception	   to	   urgent	   and	   emergency	   ambulance	  
services,	  Spezzino	  defined	  the	  exception	  to	  Articles	  49	  TFEU	  and	  56	  TFEU	  as	  a	  subset	  of	  CPV	  
code	   85143000	   Ambulance	   Services.	   However,	   under	   Articles	   23	   and	   87	   of	   Directive	  
2014/24/EU,	   the	  Commission	   is	  empowered	   to	  change	   the	  nomenclature	   if	  appropriate	   in	  
the	  future.	  	  	  
This	  decoupling	  between	  the	  exception	  and	  a	  specific	  CPV	  code	  is	  problematic	  as	   it	  
can	   be	   interpreted	   by	   contracting	   authorities	   as	   being	   applicable	   to	   any	   85143000	  
Ambulance	   Service	   contract.	   This	   would	   constitute	   a	   large	   extension	   to	   the	   scope	   of	   the	  
decision.	   In	   the	   spirit	   of	   cooperation	  with	   the	   referring	  Court,	   the	  CJEU	  had	  no	   trouble	   in	  
assuming	   that	   a	   cross-­‐border	   interest	   existed	   as	   a	   baseline	   to	   deliver	   its	   judgement.	  
However,	   it	  has	  not	  done	  the	  same	  exercise	  to	  extend	  the	  exception	  to	  Articles	  49	  and	  56	  
TFEU	  to	  all	  ambulance	  services.	  The	  ruling	  can	  be	  considered	  to	  provide	  a	  certain	  caveat	  to	  
this	   view,	   as	   the	   interpretation	  of	   the	  TFEU	  articles	   is	   to	  be	  applicable	  national	   legislation	  
dealing	  with	  issues	  “such	  as	  […]	  the	  provision	  of	  urgent	  and	  emergency	  ambulance	  services	  
[…].”	  	  	  
Connected	   with	   this	   issue	   is	   the	   situation	   that	   not	   all	   urgent	   and	   emergency	  
ambulance	   services	   are	   carried	   out	   via	   land	   transport.	   Air	   ambulances	   may	   be	   classified	  
under	   other	   codes,	   for	   example	   85140000	   Miscellaneous	   Health	   Services	   and	   as	   argued	  
above,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  UK	  there	  are	  charities	  undertaking	  these	  services.	  Although	  the	  author	  
is	  of	   the	  opinion	   that	   the	   interpretation	  of	   the	  Spezzino	   exception	   should	  be	   restrictive,	   it	  
appears	   clear	   that	   in	   this	   instance	   the	   Court	   was	   referring	   to	   any	   urgent	   and	   emergency	  





This	  paper	  argued	  that	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  Spezzino	  judgment	  is	  smaller	  than	  could	  be	  
anticipated.	  This	  is	  due	  to	  a	  cumulative	  list	  of	  factors.	  First,	  the	  exclusion	  is	  only	  applicable	  
to	  urgent	  and	  emergency	  ambulance	  services.	  As	   the	  decision	  set	  aside	   the	  application	  of	  
Articles	   49	   and	   56	   TFEU	   only	   and	   not	   Directive	   2004/18/EC,	   any	   contract	   covered	   by	  
secondary	  legislation	  cannot	  fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  decision.	  Second,	  the	  requirements	  
set	   in	   Spezzino	   are	   to	   be	   interpreted	   restrictively	   as	   they	   impose	   an	   exception	   to	   the	  
principles	   of	   equal	   treatment	   and	  non-­‐discrimination,	   as	  well	   as	  Articles	   49	   and	   56	   TFEU.	  
Third,	   Directive	   2014/24/EU	   explicitly	   includes	   in	   its	   coverage	   ambulance	   services,	  
subjecting	  them	  to	  the	  reduced	  regulation	  of	  the	  light	  touch	  regime	  contained	  in	  Articles	  74	  
to	  77.	  This	  regime	  only	  applies	  to	  contracts	  above	  €750,000,	  however.	  There	  is	  a	  degree	  of	  
uncertainty	  as	  to	  whether	  this	  inclusion	  covers	  both	  urgent	  and	  emergency	  medical	  services	  
(the	  object	   of	  Spezzino’s	   decision)	   or	   only	   the	   former,	   depending	  on	   the	  normative	   value	  
                     
57	  Regulation	  EC	  No	  2195/2002	  as	  amended	  by	  Commission	  Regulation	  EC	  no	  213/2008.	  
12 
given	   to	   Recital	   28	   of	   Directive	   2014/24/EU.	   In	   any	   case,	   both	   urgent	   and	   emergency	  
ambulance	   services	  with	   a	   value	   below	   the	   €750,000	   threshold	   and	   cross-­‐border	   interest	  
are	  subject	  to	  the	  ruling.	  Consequently,	  the	  impact	  on	  third	  sector	  organisations	  will	  depend	  
on	  the	  interpretation	  of	  Recital	  28	  in	  first	  instance.	  
Irrespective	   of	   the	   actual	   scope	   of	   the	   Spezzino	   ruling,	   it	   raises	   a	   number	   of	  
theoretical	  and	  practical	  problems	  which	  are	  relevant	  for	  thirds	  sector	  organisations	  wishing	  
to	   take	   part	   in	   the	   procurement	   of	   ambulance	   services.	   First,	   by	   allowing	   contracting	  
authorities	   to	   award	   contracts	   directly	   and	  without	   competition	   it	  makes	   life	   difficult	   for	  
third	  sector	  organisations	  without	  direct	  access	  to	  the	  key	  decision	  makers	  and	  reduces	  the	  
efficiency	  of	  the	  market.	  Second,	  third	  sector	  organisations	  based	  on	  other	  Member	  States	  
can	   freely	   be	   discriminated	   against,	   as	   can	   the	   national	   ones	   as	   well.	   Finally,	   urgent	   and	  
emergency	  services	  do	  not	  have	   their	  own	  CPV	  code	  and	  are	  a	   sub-­‐set	  of	   code	  85143000	  
Ambulance	  Services.	  Consequently,	  it	  may	  be	  hard	  to	  distinguish	  ones	  from	  the	  others.	  It	  is	  
possible	  that	  contracting	  authorities	  may	  misinterpret	  Spezzino	  as	  giving	  them	  full	  flexibility	  
to	  award	  any	  ambulance	  service	  contracts	  directly.	  	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
 
